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LITTLE AMERICA REFINING CO., A 
Corporation dba LITTLE AMERICA, 
Defendants-Respondent. 
Case No. /sr 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
THIS IS THE SECOND TIME THIS MATTER HAS COME 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for the balance 
due on a contract for the purchase of a bus. The Court held that the 
plaintifffs acceptance of a check for an amount less than that due 
resulted in an accord and satisfaction and dismissed the plaintiff's 
action and denied recovery by the plaintiff. The Court also denied 
plaintifffs claim for $845.00 damages to a bus loaned to defendant. 
There is no dispute concerning the existence of the contract, the original 
contract price of $28,514.37, nor the amount paid by defendant of 
$25,107.11. There is no issue involving breach of contract or cancellation 
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of the contract since both parties sought performance of the contract. 
The lower court after the first trial, in an order prepared 
by Mr. Bird,attorney for the defendant, dismissed the complaint on 
the basis of an accord and satisfaction and stated 
". . • and that the complaint of the plaintiff and 
the counterclaim of the defendant should be and hereby are 
dismissed with prejudice*" 
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the Complaint but 
the defendant did not appeal the dismissal of the counterclaim. This 
Honorable Court issued its unanimous decision reversing the lower 
Court. The Supreme Court concluded its well reasoned decision of 
May 15, 1975 as follows: 
" . . . the finding of an accord and satisfaction 
and the judgement based thereon are in error. The judgement 
is reversed. Costs to plain tiff /appellant.1? Tates, Inc. vs. 
Little America 535 P 2nd 1228. 
What happened from that time on is appalling and the 
illogical results are the reason we are back taking up the time of this 
Court© 
The defendant contended its counterclaim should be reconsidered 
but after argument on the matter, Judge Hall's memorandum decision of 
August 21, 1975 stated as follows: 
"The Judgement should be and the same is hereby granted 
in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,407.26. 
4. That defendants counterclaim should not again be 
considered since no appeal was taken to the Court1s prior 
dismissal of the same." 
This memo-decision was in error because it did not provide for 
interest and attorneys fee. 
On September 4, 1975 Judgement was entered in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant in the amount of $3,407.26 with no interest or 
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attorney's fees and costs and the Court ruled it had no jurisdiction 
to hear the counterclaim the same having been dismissed with prejudice 
with no appeal therefrom• 
On September 12, 1975 the defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial which motion was argued and the prior evidence stipulated in* 
The Court, by its Judgement December 30, 1975, handled the counterclaim 
as a set off allowing plaintiff a recovery of $3,407*26 and the defendant 
a set off in the amount of $2,992*50. In order to arrive at this 
judgement the Court committed six (6) errors which are as followss 
1* The court erroneously reinstated a counterclaim dismissed 
with prejudice through the back door by treating the counterclaim as a 
set off* 
2* The court erroneously found that the plaintiff promised 
delivery of the bus by the end of November 1972* 
3* Apparently the court then erroneously found this so-called 
promise was in fact, a new contract* 
4. The court erroneously found defendants were entitled to 
compensation for renting a bus between November 30, 1972 and January 16, 1973 
and then erroneously found that $2,992.50 was a reasonable rental charge 
for a bus for 1% months use* 
5* The lower court further errored in not allowing the plaintiff 
the $845*00 damages to repair its loaner bus and in not allowing plaintiff 
attorney1s fees and interest at the rate of 18% per annum* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the most recent decision of the 
lower court and prays for a judgment in its favor for the sum of $3,407*26 
plus interest at th$ rate of*18% per annum from delivery date of the bus 
January 16, 1973 to present, costs of this proceeding and reasonable Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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attomeyfs fees and the sum of $845 • 00 for damages to its loaner bus 
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 1, 1972 to date* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts concerning the full transaction are set forth in 
the plaintiff1s previous printed brief pages 2-6* We pray the court 
review those pages and the arguments set forth in that brief which we 
make a part hereof by reference* 
~*/ ~ Since this Court has already ruled in favor of Judgement for 
the Plaintiff, we address ourselves only to the facts surrounding the 
counterclaim* 
The first step in production of the bus was building the 
chasis at the Madsen plant* The Madsen plant encountered delays* During 
this delay period, the representatives of plaintiff and defendant had 
constant contact* Mr* Knight of defendant company urged delivery and 
Mr* Knaus of plaintiff company regularly contacted the Madsen company 
trying to get delivery of the bus (R* 52,61)* The defendant did not 
cancel the contract, but on the contrary continued to affirm the 
contract and sought delivery as soon as possible. 
When Madsen finished its part of the contract, it billed plaintiff 
for its costs and plaintiff billed defendant for part payment* After 
some delay and discussions, defendant paid $10,000*00 in a check made out to 
plaintiff and Madsen dated November 11, 1972 (Ex* 5D)* At the time the 
check was given to plaintiff, Mr* Knaus and Mr* Knight discussed the 
completion of the bus and in defendants witness, Mr* Knightfs own words, 
"felt confident that we would have the bus by the end of November*" (R* 99) 
In order to assist the defendant as a courtesy (R* 60) but 
without being obligated the plaintiff bought a used, exceptionally clean 
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1972. The bus cost $1,816*00 (R. 57-59)# The bus was in good running 
condition when delivered but was burned up by defendant who had to 
have it repaired and claims the cost of the repairs against the plaintiff 
in the amount of $239.76 (Ex. 4D). Bus was returned to plaintiff 
near December, 1972 with motor completely burned out, costing plaintiff 
$845#00 which plaintiff claims should be paid by defendant. 
After November the defendant rented a bus and claims the 
plaintiff should pay the cost of renting the bus which the lower court 
found amounted to $2,992.50• 
The new bus was delivered to defendant January 16, 1973 and 
a delivery receipt and bill was signed by defendants representative, 
Dave Timlinson, stating the total price of $28,514.37 and calling for 
payment of 18% interest, collection costs and attorneyfs fees if 
required for collection (Ex. 3P). Mr. Timlinson drove the bus away 
and that delivery receipt and Tates official billing were sent to 
defendant on or soon after January 16, 1973. The billing called for 
payment of a balance of $18,514.37 (Ex. 8D). 
The defendants sent a check for $15,107.11 dated February 17, 
1973 and received February 21, 1973 holding out $3,407.26. This court 
considered the matter once and, in effect, said defendants couldnft 
hold out $3,407.26 giving Judgement to the plaintiff for that amount 
which makes us wonder why we are back before the Supreme Court again 
asking for the same thing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REINSTATED A COUNTERCLAIM PREVIOUSLY 
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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE THROUGH THE BACKDOOR BY TREATING IT AS A SET-
OFF. THERE CAN BE NO SET OFF IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT FOR $2,992.50 
SINCE THERE WERE NO PLEADINGS IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER OR THEREAFTER 
REQUESTING A SET OFF AND THE COUNTERCLAIM WHERE THE SUM WAS ALLEGED 
AS A CLAIM BY THE DEFENDANT WAS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
The Supreme Court held: 
"Accordingly, the finding of an accord and satisfaction 
and the judgment based thereon are in error." 
And then ruled "The Judgment is reversed. Costs to Plaintiff 
(appellant)." The "judgment is reversed" means the plaintiff should have 
judgment for the amount of its claim which is the balance due on the 
account and which amount is undisputed being well supported by the 
evidence and acknowledged by witnesses of both parties as $3,407.26 as of 
January 16, 1973. The Supreme Court discussed the claim of defendant for 
$3,407.26 in detail and apparently considered it without merit. Tates vs. 
Little America P. 1231. 
Contrary to defendants claim, the trial court did dispose of 
the counterclaim. The defendant put on its evidence and at the close of 
the hearing the court stated: 
"The plaintifffs complaint is dismissed, no cause of 
action and having so disposed of it your counterclaim should 
also be dismissed, no cause of action." 
Mr. Bird made up the findings and judgment which judgment stated 
in part: 
" . . . and that the complaint of the plaintiff and the 
counterclaim of the defendant should be and hereby are dismissed 
with prejudice." 
The defendant has had its day in court, presented evidence and 
had its counterclaim dismissed with prejudice. There was no appeal taken 
from that order of the trial court so the matter of the counterclaim has 
been laid to rest. 
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Rule 4Kb) states in part: 
"Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies 
a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not pro-
vided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits*" 
Blackfs Law Dictionary defines dismissal and dismissal with 
prejudice as follows: 
DISMISSAL, An order or judgment finally disposing of an 
an action, suit, motion, etc., by sending it out of court, 
though without a trial of the issues involved, Brackenridge v. 
State, 27 Tex. App* 513, 11 S.W. 630, 4 L.R.A. 360. The term 
is often used to indicate an adjudication on the merits, Knox v. 
Crump, 15 Ga, App, 697, 84 S.E. 169, 173; Butler v. McSweeney, 
222 Mass. 5, 109 N.E. 653,655. 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, An adjudication on the merits 
and final disposition, barring the right to bring or maintain 
an action on the same claim or cause. Pulley v, Chicago, R.I, 
& P. Ry, Co,, 122 Kan. 269, 251 P. 1100, 1101. It is res 
judicata as to every matter litigated, Roden v. Roden, 29 Ariz. 
549, 243 P, 413, 415. A judgment of dismissal and a judgment of 
nonsuit have the same legal effect, Suess v, Motz, 220 Mo. App, 
32,285 S«W. 775, 776, 
In the 1972 Utah case Steiner v. State, 27 U. (2d) 284, 495 P. 
2d 809 this Court held: 
"An order to dismiss with prejudice and on the merits is 
final adjudication of the issues and the time for appeal under 
Rule 73 begins to run upon entry of the order." 
There is a substantial difference between a set-off (or recoup-
ment) and a counterclaim, 
"United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co, (SD NY 
1955) 17 FRD 258, 262, 21 FR Serv. 12f. 26, Case 1 *There is a 
marked distinction between recoupment and a counterclaim which 
the plaintiff has apparently failed to note. Recoupment does not 
seek an affirmative judgement. It is defensive.1"• 
Likewise a counterclaim cannot be automatically converted into a 
set off or recoupment. 
Some authorities seem to indicate that there is some interchange 
of meaning between counterclaim and a defense, 20 Am Jur 2nd 228 discussing 
Counterclaim, and set off where the courts seem to take the view that a 
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set off can be considered a counterclaim or that a counterclaim can be 
considered a set off the defendant is out of court because once the 
counterclaim fails or is dismissed with prejudice then the set off is gone 
too. In other words, while the claim is still alive the court has some 
leeway in treating it as either a defense or a counterclaim but once the 
claim is finally dismissed it cannot be resurrected under a new name and 
come back to life. You can't get life out of a dead tree by merely 
transplanting* The lower court may claim some divine powers but its effort 
to resurrect a dead claim can only be black magic to which deceptive powers 
we are sure this court will not succumb. 
Many authorities talk about set off and counterclaims having 
alternative effect - 81 ALR 781, 46 ALR 393, 53 ALR 708* 
Rule 8(c) names all affirmative defenses but does not name a 
set off as a defense but says defenses can be treated as a counterclaim and 
visa versa• 
The Court, in our case, as well as plaintiff and defendant con-
sidered set off as the counterclaim* Rule 13 says defendant must state all 
claims in its counterclaim and Rule 12(b) says about the same thing. Logan 
City vs. Utah Power, 86 Ut. 340, 10 P. 2nd 1097 states if a party fails 
to state a claim resulting judgment is conclusive against it as to all matter 
of defense. 
Mr. Bird made up the original Judgment and without reserving any 
rights incorporated in the judgment a dismissal with prejudice of the counter-
claim and with it any so called set off. There was no appeal on that 
ruling and the judgment for plaintiff became final as a matter of law. There 
could not be an off set later on. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF PROMISED 
DELIVERY OF THE BUS BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, 1972. 
The record repeatedly shows the plaintiff never promised but 
merely had hopes delivery could be made by the end of November, 1972. On 
cross examination Mr. Knaus stated: 
"Q. What did you tell? (To Mr. Knight) 
A. Well, to the best as to what the factory was telling 
me we could deliver in a certain length of time and Ifm not 
sure that I know the date that you're referring to because there 
were several times in there." (R. 62) 
Does this sound like a promise? Does this establish a delivery 
date? All the way through when addressing this subject Mr. Knaus would 
relate to Mr. Knight what the factory said. Mr. Knaus again (R. 53) stated: 
ffA. Yes, I referred to the delivery of this unit to the 
best of our knowledge as whatever - - I would have to go back 
and check now what we stated we could do from the factory 
telling us what they could do." 
Does this sound like a promise? 
Mr. Knight (defendants witness) testified that Mr. Knaus: 
"Said that he had spoken to the people at Ward and he 
had talked with someone who was in authority at Ward and that 
he felt good about the answer he had received; and for the first 
time he felt confident that we could have the bus by the end of 
November." (R. 99) 
And on cross examination when asked if Mr. Knaus had thought 
the bus would be available, Mr. Knight testified: 
"More strongly than that - he said he was confident the 
bus - - he was confident and sure that it would be available at 
the end of November.f' (R. 124) 
Do any of these bits of testimony amount to a promise? The 
answer is obviously, No! 
POINT III 
APPARENTLY THE COURT THEN ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THIS SO-CALLED 
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PROMISE WAS A NEW CONTRACT WHEN, IN PACT, THERE WAS NO NEW CONTRACT* 
THE COURT ERRORED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S COST IN RENTING A BUS BE 
ASSESSED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF* 
There is absolutely nothing in the agreement between the 
parties that would permit defendant to claim damages against the plaintiff 
for a delay in delivery* Some contracts are written that way but this con-
tract did not provide for relief if delivery was not made as required* 
As stated before no new contract was entered into* Mr* Knight arbi trarily 
set December 1, 1972 as some sort of cut off date and unilaterally agreed 
with himself that this was a good time to start assessing charges* 
Apparently he based this on the fact that Mr* Knaus thought, after 
checking with the factory, that the bus would be ready for delivery the 
last of November* Mr* Knaus made no promises, no guarantees and no 
agreements; he merely told Mr* Knight that he "felt confident11 it could 
be delivered near the last of November* There was no agreements, oral 
or otherwise, or any other basis upon which defendant could base a claim* 
The law of contracts is so clear it hardly needs argument or 
citation of authority* All of the following sections are from the 
Restatement of Contracts* Restatement of Contracts Sec* 19 states in part: 
"The requirements of the law for the formation of an 
informal contract are: 
(b) A manifestation of assent by the parties who form 
the contract to the terms thereof, and by every promisor to 
the consideration for his promise * * * 
(c) A sufficient consideration * * • " 
Section 20 - f,A manifestation of mutual assent by the 
parties to an informal contract is essential to its formation • ••" 
Section 22 - "The manifestation of mutual assent almost 
invariably takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party 
accepted by the other party or parties"* 
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The original written offer and acceptance is the only 
contract and is the best evidence. The defendant was already committed 
to pay a full $28,514.37 - it was already committed to pay the $10,000 
and much more. Certainly a new contract cannot be found when a party 
promises to pay something which he is already committed to pay - this 
could not be good consideration. 
Section 75 comment (a) under consideration states: 
"No duty is generally imposed on one who makes an 
informal promise unless the promise is supported by 
sufficient consideration." 
Section 76 - "any consideration ... is sufficient ... 
except the following: 
(a) an act or forbearance required by a legal duty that 
is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable 
dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor or the 
public ..." 
Obviously there was no new contract requiring plaintiff to 
deliver a bus before December 1, 1972. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO 
COMPENSATION FOR RENTING A BUS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 30, 1972 AND JANUARY 16, 
1973 AND THEN ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT $2,992.50 WAS A REASONABLE RENTAL 
CHARGE FOR A BUS FOR 1% MONTHS USE. 
How unfair could the Court be? 
Because of the defendants concern about its need during the 
summer for another bus the plaintiff located a bus in Boise, Idaho, bought 
it for $1,816.00, drove it to Salt Lake City and turned it over to 
defendant for its use without charge in July, 1972 (R. 57-59, 120) 
There was no obligation by contract to provide the bus; it was 
turned over to Little America strictly as a courtesy without charge. (R. 60, 
98) 
The defendant returned the bus in about December, 1972 in such 
poor condition that it had to have a complete motor overhaul at a cost to 
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plaintiff of $845•00* (R. 80) The defendant never so much as questioned 
this cost at the trial and yet the lower Court completely ignored the 
claim as originally set forth in plaintiff's Reply. 
The bus traveled 250 miles a day. (R. 112, 113) It traveled 
during the heaviest traffic time during the busiest and hottest time of 
the year. (R. 119) Driving a bus fully loaded in the heat of the summer 
250 miles a day is extremely heavy use and very hard on any type of 
equipment. The defendant surely knew they must at least repair the 
vehicle if they received the equipment, tires, etc. free of charge. They 
would have to repair their own equipment as part of their operating 
expense surely the court cannot hold the plaintiff to repair the equipment 
when it had been turned over to defendant for use as its own without 
charge. The defendant literally burned up the motor and then demanded 
the plaintiff pay for sum $239.76 for motor repairs near the end of 
November, 1972. The cost of these repairs were assessed against the 
plaintiff by the lower Court in the first Judgement but rejected the 
claim in its second Judgement. 
Now after using the plaintiff1s bus free for five months and 
burning it up the defendant charged the plaintiff for renting a bus for 
December 1, 1972 through January 16, 1973 and then claimed the rental 
charge was $2,000.00 per month. What a ridiculous charge - if the 
plaintiff decided to charge the defendant $2,000.00 a month for using 
the bus the defendant would owe plaintiff $10f000.00. This would mean 
a years rental on a bus would cost $20,000 which is almost the purchase 
price of a new bus. If we took Mr. Knight1s higher figure of $75 per 
day on a 7 day week operation the defendant would have paid out $27,375 
a year. 
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The court allowed testimony on costs of operating a bus and 
testimony on the reasonableness of such cost from Mr. Knight who was 
shown by the Voir Dire questions of plaintiff's attorney to not be 
qualified as a sufficient expert to do so. (R. 107) The witnesses basis 
for computing costs was completely erroneous. 
Mr. Knight is a business man, an office man (R. 108) with 
offices principally in Salt Lake City. Little America has a manager in 
Wyoming who takes charge of the buses, dispatches them and sees that 
buses are available, fueled and repaired. This Wyoming Manager also 
arranged for the rental of buses. (R. 107) Mr. Knight's testimony 
concerning costs was allowed over the objections of the plaintiff. (R. 108) 
The witness was clearly mixed up in referring to costs of operating and 
costs of renting a bus. The court cannot from the evidence here determine 
how charges should be assessed even if they were justified. (R. 112, 114) 
There is no competent evidence in the record. Mr. Knight stated the 
22 to 25 cents per mile he was charging the plaintiff included fuel and 
oil (R. 114). It should be obvious to the court that fuel and oil would 
have to be paid by the defendant if it was using its own bus. The cost 
of fuel should not have been assessed against plaintiff. This shows 
defendants1 figures are all off because Mr. Knight arrived at his $62.50 
per day figure by multiplying 25<t per mile times 250 miles per day. Though 
the testimony was $62.50 per day somehow the Court comes out with a 
set off of $2,992.50 for 1% months. 
The Court obviously was taken in and errored grieviously. The 
true test for a bus rental cost as any high school student would know is 
the actual rental cost to lease a bus by the month. Though the figure was 
never put in the record it would be somewhere between $200-$500 per month 
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and the leasee puts on his own driver and pays fuel and repair costs. 
AS THE RECORD STANDS THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY A 
FINDING OF RENTAL COSTS. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF 
THE $845.00 DAMAGES TO REPAIR ITS LOANER BUS AND IN NOT ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEE AND INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 18% PER ANNUM. 
The defendant returned the bus in about December, 1972 in 
such poor condition that it had to have a complete motor overhaul at 
a cost to plaintiff of $845.00 (R. 80) The defendant never so much as 
questioned this cost at the trial and yet the lower Court completely 
ignored the claim as originally set forth in plaintiff1s Reply. This 
fact and the fact the Court struck out of the plaintiff's proposed 
order all interest - not even simple interest of 6% shows the Court 
acted on some kind of passion and prejudice. The further fact the 
lower court refused to allow attorney1s fee is further evidence that 
the court may not take kindly to being overruled. We base our claim 
for attorney1s fee and 18% interest from the date the bus was delivered, 
January 16, 1973, on the following statement on the delivery receipt 
Exhibit 3P signed by the authorized agent of defendant. 
Terms are Cash on Delivery. Estimates are for Labor only. 
Materials and Parts extra. We will not be responsible for 
any loss by fire or theft beyond our control. Vehicles being 
road tested are done so at owner1s risk. Interest will be 
charged on all past due accounts computed at the periodic rate 
of 1*$% per month, which is a per annum rate of 18%. Purchaser 
also agrees to pay collection costs, including court cost and 
reasonable attorney fees if collection is required. 
Received By: /s/ Dave Timlinson 
The defendants accepted delivery of the bus on January 16, 1973, 
(R. 64) by sending a duly authorized representative as conceded by counsel 
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for defendant, Mr. Bird, who stated: "Admit he got into the bus and 
drove away also admit he was our employee for that purpose." (R. 78) 
Mr. Urie was present when bus was delivered. Mr. Timlinson, 
who picked up the bus, stated he was an employee. He signed the original 
of the Exhibit 3 combination invoice, billing and delivery receipt as 
an agent and "Took delivery of the bus and left our premises". (R 77, 78) 
There was no objection to the billing for $28,514.37 at the time of 
delivery. Exhibit 8d shows the billing as of January 16, 1973 as 
$18,514.37 reduced to $3,407.26 as of February 21st. Actually 18% 
interest on $18,514.37 for the period January 16th to February 21st would 
be about $280 with 18% on $3,407.26 from February 21, 1973 compounded 
annually until finally paid. The defendant was billed monthly thereafter 
similar to the bill Exhibit 8d and each bill carried the following notes 
INTEREST will be CHARGED on all past due accounts com-
puted at the PERIODIC RATE of 1^% PER MONTH, which is a 
PER ANNUM RATE of 18%. Purchaser also agrees to pay collection 
costs, including court cost and reasonable attorney fees if 
collection is required. 
Surely these documents put the defendant on notice as to what 
interest rates would have to be paid if he didn't pay his bill and that 
costs and attorneys fee would have to be paid if collection was required. 
When this Court did not mention interest and attorney's fees in its last 
reversal the defendant argued that it meant we were not entitled to such 
an award. 
We respectfully request the Court specifically order that the 
plaintiff is entitled to 18% interest on $18,514. from January 16, 1973 until 
February 21, 1973 and thereafter 18% interest on $3,407. compounded 
annually until paid together with costs and reasonable attorney's fee which 
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would now be at least $2,500 and further that the defendant pay to 
Plaintiff $845.00 damages at the rate of 6% interest compounded annually 
until paid* If such a specific order is not entered by the Court, 
judging from past performance in the lower Court, we will end up in 
another appeal to this Court in regards to interest and attorneys fees. 
WHEREFORE we pray the Honorable Court again reverse the 
lower Court in its finding of a set off and find the defendant owes 
plaintiff $3,407*26 plus interest at the rate of 18% as set forth 
above in addition to the sum of $845 plus interest and reasonable attorneys 
fees of $2,500.00* 
DATED this 17th day of March, 1976. 
Respectfully ^ tlbmitted 
h E. Sohm 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Suite 81 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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